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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants to 
secure the following relief: 
BY HIS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. To have declared null and void a purported bid of Salt 
Lake City Chamber of Commerce to purchase the property 
belonging to Salt Lake City which is located at the southeast 
intersection of First South and State Streets in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
2. To have declared void the purported acceptance of the 
above mentioned bid of the Salt Lake Chamber of Commerce 
by defendant Salt Lake City. 
3. The defendant, Salt Lake City, be enjoined from enter-
ing into a contract or undertaking whereby it agrees to convey 
the property above mentioned to the Chamber of Commerce 
or to defendant, Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or to defendant, Zions 
Securities Corporation, or any of their agencies or subsidiaries. 
4. To enjoin defendants, Salt Lake City and its Com-
missioners, from conveying the above mentioned city property 
to anyone until it has provided facilities for its officers and 
employes while engaged in the performance of the govern-
mental functions of defendant city. 
5. To have it adjudged that neither defendant, Zions 
Securities Corporation, nor defendant, Corporation of the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
2 
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may purchase a site for the erection thereon of a Federal Build-
ing, nor use any of their assets in payment of the purchase 
price thereof. 
6. That such other and further relief be granted as may 
appear to be just and proper, and for costs (R. 10). 
In a Second Cause of Action plaintiff seeks to have 
declared null and void a purported Contract wherein defendant 
City seeks to sell and the Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints seeks to purchase 
a tract of land consisting of approximately 64.59 acres in Blocks 
45 and 46, Ten Acre Plat "A," Big Field Survey, situated 
in Section 20, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, in Salt Lake City and County, Utah, such property 
being generally known as Forest Dale Park (R. 10). 
Lynn Fausett and his wife, Fiametta Fausett, who join in 
the Appeal filed in the cause, a Petition to Intervene herein, 
together with a proposed Complaint in Intervention (R. 50). 
There was also filed in the cause in the court below a request 
for an Amendment to the Complaint, together with the pro-
posed Amendment thereof (R. 58). 
In compliance with Motions to Dismiss filed by each of 
the defendants, the First Cause of Action was dismissed as to 
all of the defendants (R. 71). The Second Cause of Action 
was dismissed as to all of the defendants except Salt Lake City 
and its Commissioners. 
In its Judgment of Dismissal the court below stated that 
it was not necessary to rule upon the Petition of the Fausetts 
3 
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to intervene or upon the Motions to sever the two causes of 
action. No ruling was had on the Motion to Amend (R. 72). 
This Appeal is prosecuted from the Judgment so rendered. 
Following is a summary of the allegations of the Com-
plaint: 
1. That the plaintiff is and at all times alleged in the 
Complaint has been a property owner and taxpayer of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and for a number of years was a member of 
and a tithe payer and contributor to the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, and as such has an interest in the trust 
fund held by defendants, Zions Securtities Corporation and 
the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, and that he brings the action for himself 
and all other persons similarly situated. 
2. That Salt Lake City is and at all times alleged in the 
Complaint has been a Municipal Corporation of Utah, and that 
J. Bracken Lee, Joe L. Christensen, L. C. Romney, T. I. Geurts, 
and J. K. Piercey are and since January, I960, have been its 
Commissioners. 
3. The defendant, Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, is a corporation 
sole, organized for religious and charitable purposes under the 
laws of the State of Utah, and David O. McKay is and has 
been at all times alleged in the Complaint the constituted 
Corporation Sole, of such Corporation. 
4. That defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, is and 
at all times alleged in the Complaint has been a Utah Cor-
poration. 
4 
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5. That all of the capital stock of defendant, Zions 
Securities Corporation (except a few shares placed in the 
names of its Directors to enable them to qualify as Directors 
thereof), is owned by defendant, Corporation Sole, and that 
defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, is and at all times 
alleged in the Complaint has been engaged solely in carrying 
out a part of the business of defendant Corporation Sole. 
6. That defendant, Chamber of Commerce, is a non-
profit Utah Corporation, and that Gus P. Backman is and 
during the time mentioned in the Complaint was its Secretary. 
7. That the purpose or object of defendant Corporation 
Sole as stated in its Articles of Incorporation is to acquire, hold 
and dispose of such real and personal property as may be 
conveyed to or acquired by it for the benefit of the members 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious 
society, for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for 
public worship. 
8. That the purpose of defendant, Chamber of Commerce, 
as stated in its Last Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation 
is "to promote the general welfare of the City and County 
of Salt Lake and State of Utah, to engage and assist in social 
relief work therein and to carry on such other and related 
activities as are ordinarily and normally engaged in by Cham-
bers of Commerce." 
9. That the Articles of defendant, Chamber of Commerce, 
also provide that the management and control thereof shall be 
vested in a Board of Governors, eight of whom shall constitute 
a quorum. 
5 
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10. That heretofore the Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City granted an option to defendant, Zions Securities Corpora-
tion, to purchase for the sum of $750,000 a tract of land upon 
which the Lafayette School is situated. In such option it was 
recited that the property for which the option was granted was 
to be used for the erection thereon of a Federal Building. 
11. That an action was brought to enjoin the Board of 
Education from selling the Lafayette School site, and a Lis 
Pendens was recorded in the office of the County Recorder of 
Salt Lake County, giving notice that such action had been 
brought. 
12. That no restraining order was issued in said action, 
and pursuant to the above mentioned option the property 
covered by the option was conveyed to Zions Securities Cor-
poration, which now holds the title to the Lafayette School 
property for the purpose of having erected thereon a Federal 
Building. 
13. That on February 4, I960, a purported bid was made 
by defendant, Chamber of Commerce, to Salt Lake City to pur-
chase the property at First South and State Streets. Such pur-
ported bid is set out in full in paragraph 13 of the Complaint. 
Among its provisions are the following: 
"That the price shall be $750,000.00 if possession is 
given on or before January 1, 1961, and $725,000.00 
if possession is given on or before March 23, 1961. 
That there must be furnished either an abstract of title 
or title insurance of the property and the title shall 
be subject to approval by the General Services Admin-
istration of the United States Government/' 
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The purported bid provided for payment of the purchase 
price by installments and further that if an action were brought 
to nullify the contract of sale, or if a referendum election 
were called to question the validity of the sale of property, 
the bidder at its option would be released from purchasing 
the property, and any money paid would be returned to the 
bidder. The purported bid also provided that the property 
would be conveyed to whomsoever the bidder should desig-
nate. A Cashier's Check for $15,000 accompanied the pur-
ported bid. 
14. In paragraph 14 of the Complaint the property in-
tended to be covered by the purported bid is described by 
metes and bounds. 
15. In paragraph 15 of the Complaint it is alleged upon 
information and belief that defendant, Chamber of Commerce, 
was without authority to make the purported bid for the city 
property; that Gus P. Backman was not authorized by the 
Chamber of Commerce to make such purported bid. 
16. In paragraph 16 of the Complaint it is alleged upon 
information and belief that the purported bid made by Gus 
P. Backman for the purchase of the city property was made 
at the solicitation of defendant, Corporation of the President, 
and as its agent, Zions Securities Corporation. 
17. In paragraph 17 of the Complaint it is alleged upon 
information and belief that if the above mentioned city prop-
erty is acquired by either of the defendants, Chamber of 
Commerce, Gus P. Backman, Zions Securities or the Corporation 
of the President, it is planned by them to induce the General 
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Services Administration to purchase the same for the erection 
thereon of a Federal Building. 
18. In paragraph 18 it is alleged on information and 
belief that to secure a site suitable for a Federal Building 
it is necessary that property in addition to that owned by the 
City must be purchased at a cost of several hundred thousand 
dollars. 
19. In paragraph 19 plaintiff alleges upon information 
and belief that if the purported arrangement for the sale of 
the city property is permitted to be carried out, defendant 
Corporation of the President, or its owned Zions Securities 
Corporation, will be compelled to pay several hundred thousand 
dollars for a site for a Federal Building in addition to the 
amount that will be received from the federal government. 
20. In paragraph 20 of the Complaint it is alleged on 
information and belief that defendants, Gus P. Backman 
and the Corporation of the President, intend to and will unless 
restrained by the Court carry out the plan to furnish a site 
for the construction thereon of a Federal Building, and that 
such plan and agreement is null and void because: 
(a) That defendants, Corporation of the President by 
its agent, Zions Securities, already have a title to a tract of 
land known as the Lafayette School site, which it acquired 
under the pretext that the same was to be used for the erection 
thereon of a Federal Building, and is estopped from securing 
an additional site for the same purpose, there being only one 
Federal Building in contemplation of being constructed at this 
time in Salt Lake City. 
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(b) That neither the Corporation of the President nor 
Zions Securities have any right to use the trust fund held by 
them to pay for a site for a Federal Building or any part thereof. 
(c) and (d) That neither defendant, Corporation of 
the President, nor defendant, Zions Securities, had at the time 
complained of any right or authority to purchase a site for a 
Federal Building, nor to select a site for a Federal Building. 
(e) and (f) That if defendant Corporation of the Presi-
dent and/or Zions Securities Corporation is permitted to prevail 
upon an officer of the United States to select a site for the 
purpose of pleasing such defendants, and by paying a substan-
tial part of the purchase price, if so purchased, such action will 
be in violation of Section 4, Article I of the Constitution of 
Utah, which provides that "there shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any Church dominate the State nor inter-
fere with its function/' and likewise such action will be in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and also in violation of Section 7, and of Section 
22, of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, which provide 
that private property may not be taken without due process 
of law, nor may such property be taken without just com-
pensation. That if the beneficiaries of the trust fund are de-
prived of their interest in the trust fund in the manner attempted 
they will be deprived of such interest without due process of 
law and without just compensation. 
21. In paragraph 21 of his Complaint, plaintiff alleges on 
information and belief that defendant City was without author-
ity to accept the purported bid for sale of its property at First 
South and State Streets, and is without authority at this time 
to sell such property because: 
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(a) That four members of the Commission of defendant 
City are and at the time the above mentioned purported bid 
was made were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, and as such had an interest in the trust fund 
of defendant, Corporation of the President, and of Zions Securi-
ties; that it was and is planned by the defendants herein that 
the City property at First South and State Streets be conveyed 
to defendant, Zions Securities, in which the four members of 
defendant City are beneficiaries, and that said City property 
is, according to such plan, to be conveyed to the United States 
Government as a site for a Federal Building. That at the time 
said purported bid was made and purported to have been 
accepted, said Commissioners who were and are members of 
said Church and as such were disqualified from participating 
in the transaction above mentioned by reason of the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 10-6-38. 
(b) That one of the cardinal principles of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is that its members shall comply 
with the announced desires of its leaders, and particularly its 
President and Counselors. That when it was learned that 
difficulties were encountered in the proposed construction of 
a Federal Building on the Lafayette School site, it was con-
ceived by the leaders of the Church that another site should 
be acquired. That defendant Gus P. Backman, a member of 
said Church, was called upon by the leaders of said Church 
to aid in an undertaking to acquire the above mentioned City 
property, and to get the consent of the proper officers of the 
United States to accept the same as a site for a Federal Building. 
That when it was learned that the leaders of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints desired to purchase the above men-
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tioned City property for the erection thereon of a Federal 
Building, defendant, City Commissioners, proceeded to have 
the property appraised, to have the same declared obsolete, to 
advertise the same for sale so that a sale might be made to 
defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, so that the same 
might in turn be sold to the United States. 
(c) That the purported bid of Gus P. Backman for and 
on behalf of defendant, Chamber of Commerce, having been 
made without authority, any contract made pursuant thereto 
will cast a cloud on the title to the City property above 
described. 
(d) , (e) and (f) That the above mentioned City property 
is now and for years past has been devoted to furnishing offices 
and other facilities for officers of defendant City in the perform-
ance of the governmental functions of the City; that such build-
ing is reasonably adequate to serve such purposes for a number 
of years, and that no adequate arrangements have been made 
for other buildings to serve such purpose, and defendant 
City is without funds to provide for other buildings to serve 
for the purposes which are now being provided for by the 
above mentioned building at First South and State Streets. 
(g) That neither defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, 
the Corporation of the President, Gus P. Backman, nor the 
Chamber of Commerce, have the authority to purchase the 
above mentioned City property for the purpose of conveying 
the same to the United States, and that the purported agree-
ment to sell the same for such purpose will cast a cloud on 
the title of defendant City, and prevent the City from selling 
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the same to some other purchaser until after such cloud is 
removed. 
For a Second Cause of Action, plaintiff in substance 
alleges: 
He adopts as a part of his Second Cause of Action the 
allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 7 and all relevant allegations 
contained in his First Cause of Action. 
In paragraph 2 of his Second Cause of Action he alleges 
that prior to January 14, 1959, defendant City was the owner 
of approximately 64.59 acres of land located in Blocks 45 and 
46, Ten Acre Plat "A," Big Field Survey, situated in Section 
20, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian in 
Salt Lake City and County, Utah. 
In paragraph 3 it is alleged: That on January 14, 1959, 
defendant City and defendant Corporation of the President 
entered into a contract wherein the City agreed to sell and the 
Corporation of the President agreed to purchase the property 
above described. 
In paragraph 4 it is alleged that the property above 
described is known as the Forest Dale Park, and for a number 
of years prior to the time the above mentioned agreement was 
entered into was used by the inhabitants of Salt Lake City for 
playing golf and other forms of amusements for which parks 
are generally used. 
In paragraph 5 of the Second Cause of Action, it is 
alleged that all of the members of the Commission of defendant 
City were, at the time the above mentioned agreement was 
entered into, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
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day Saints, holding important positions therein, and as such 
had an interest in all of the property held by defendant Cor-
poration of the President, and that because thereof were dis-
qualified from participating in the making of said contract by 
reason of the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38. 
In paragraph 6 of his Second Cause of Action plaintiff 
alleges that defendant City did not give notice, did not pass 
any valid authorization for the execution of said Contract, or 
declare that said park is no longer useful for the purposes of a 
City Park, or otherwise inform the citizens of Salt Lake City 
that said park would be sold or abandoned as a park. 
Plaintiff prayed that the Contract for the sale of the Forest 
Dale Park be declared null and void, and for general relief 
(R.11). 
Lynn Fausett and Fiametta Fausett filed a Motion to Inter-
vene in the above entitled cause, together with a proposed 
Complaint in Intervention. The basis for leave of the Fausetts 
to intervene as alleged in their Motion is that plaintiff in the 
action was not presently a member of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, and, therefore, is without interest 
in the trust fund held by the defendants Corporation of the 
President and/or Zions Securities; that the applicants may be 
bound by a judgment rendered in the action, and will be ad-
versely affected by the use of the trust fund held by such 
defendants, if the same is used for paying a part of the purchase 
price of a site for a Federal Building, and that if they are 
not permitted to intervene, needless delay and cost will be 
incurred by the bringing of a separate action. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In their proposed Complaint in Intervention the Fausetts 
allege that they are and at all times alleged in their proposed 
Complaint in Intervention have been tithe payers and con-
tributors to the trust fund held by said defendants, and as 
such have an interest in such trust fund; that they are and at all 
times alleged in the Complaint have been residents and tax-
payers in Salt Lake City and County, Utah. By their proposed 
Complaint in Intervention the Fausetts bring their action for 
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, and they 
adopt the allegations of the Complaint as a part of their 
Complaint in Intervention. 
The Fausetts prayed judgment as prayed for in the 
Complaint (R. 51). 
Plaintiff and the Fausetts asked leave to file an Amend-
ment to the Complaint wherein they alleged that the City 
Commission did not adopt any Resolution or Ordinance as to 
the sale of the property referred to; that no lawful bid was 
submitted; that there was no bid for such property, nor a lawful 
acceptance of any bid, and the proceedings had on January 
28th, and on February 4, I960, were each of no force or effect 
to legalize the unlawful attempt to sell said property (R. 58). 
Each of the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss each of 
the Causes of Action. The Trial Court granted the Motion of 
each of the defendants to dismiss the First Cause of Action 
and also the Second Cause of Action as to each of the defen-
dants except the Motion of Salt Lake City and its Commis-
sioners, which was denied (R. 72). Defendants Salt Lake City 
and its Commissioners also filed in the cause an Answer in 
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which some of the allegations of the Complaint were admitted, 
and others were denied (R. 28). 
Defendants also filed objections to the Fausetts filing their 
Complaint in Intervention, and also Motions to sever the two 
causes of action. 
The Trial Court refused to pass upon these matters for 
the stated reason that it was not necessary to do so. No men-
tion was made by the Trial Court with respect to the Motions 
of plaintiff for leave to amend his Complaint. 
It is upon the pleadings so summmarized and the Judgment 
rendered thereon that this appeal is prosecuted. 
Appellant relies upon the following Points for reversal 
of the Judgment appealed from: 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE CITY AND 
ITS COMMISSIONERS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT SAID DEFENDANTS 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 
U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-2, and 10-8-8, BEFORE MAKING ITS 
PURPORTED CONTRACT TO SELL THE PROPERTY 
AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE CITY AND 
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ITS COMMISSIONERS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT SAID DEFENDANTS 
DID NOT PASS ANY LAWFUL RESOLUTION OR 
DECLARATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO SELL THE 
PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS, 
DID NOT GIVE ANY LAWFUL NOTICE OF THE SALE 
OF SAID PROPERTY, DID NOT RECEIVE ANY LAW-
FUL BID FOR THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY, DID 
NOT MAKE A LAWFUL ACCEPTANCE OF A BID FOR 
THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY, AND DID NOT ENTER 
INTO A LAWFUL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE 
THEREOF. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE CITY AND 
ITS COMMISSIONERS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT THE PURPORTED BID 
MADE FOR THE PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND 
STATE STREETS WAS MADE BY DEFENDANT 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BY ITS SECRETARY, WHICH 
BID SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT THE SAME WAS FOR 
SOME ONE OTHER THAN THE CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, AND IT WAS KNOWN, OR SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN KNOWN BY DEFENDANTS CITY AND ITS 
COMMISSIONERS THAT DEFENDANT CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO MAKE 
A BID FOR THE PURCHASE OF SAID PROPERTY, AND 
WITHOUT FUNDS TO PAY FOR THE SAME. 
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POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY AND ITS 
COMMISSIONERS, IN THAT ALL BUT ONE OF THE 
COMMISSIONERS WERE AT THE TIME OF THE PUR-
PORTED CONTRACT OF SALE MEMBERS OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
AND AS SUCH DISQUALIFIED FROM ENGAGING IN 
A TRANSACTION FOR A SALE OF THE PROPERTY 
AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS TO DEFEN-
DANTS, CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND/OR 
ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION BY REASON OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY AND ITS 
COMMISSIONERS WITHOUT GIVING THE PLAINTIFF 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS 
ALLEGED IN HIS COMPLAINT TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE CITY PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE 
STREETS IS BEING USED FOR OFFICES FOR THE 
EMPLOYES AND OFFICERS OF DEENDANT CITY IN 
THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TIONS; THAT THE BUILDINGS THERE LOCATED ARE 
AMPLE TO SERVE SUCH PURPOSE FOR MANY MORE 
YEARS; THAT NO PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE FOR 
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ACQUIRING FACILITIES TO TAKE CARE OF THE 
NEEDS THAT ARE NOW BEING PROVIDED FOR BY 
THE CITY PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE 
STREETS, AND DEFENDANT CITY IS PRESENTLY 
WITHOUT THE NECESSARY FUNDS TO SECURE 
OTHER BUILDING OR BUILDINGS TO SUPPLY THE 
NEEDS OF DEFENDANT CITY WHICH ARE NOW 
PROVIDED FOR BY THE CITY PROPERTY AT FIRST 
SOUTH AND STATE STREETS. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT THE MOTION OF LYNN FAUSETT AND 
FIAMETTA FAUSETT TO INTERVENE IN THIS 
ACTION. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT 
AND/OR DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORA-
TION WITHOUT GIVING PLAINTIFF AN OPPOR-
TUNITY TO SHOW AS ALLEGED IN HIS COMPLAINT 
THAT SUCH CORPORATION INTENDS TO AND WILL, 
UNLESS RESTRAINED BY THE COURT, UNLAWFULLY 
AND WITHOUT AUTHORITY USE SOME OF THE 
TRUST FUNDS HELD BY IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PAYING OR CAUSE TO BE PAID SOME OF THE COSTS 
OF PURCHASING A SITE FOR A FEDERAL BUILDING. 
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POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION, IN 
THAT SUCH CORPORATION ALREADY HAS RE-
CEIVED A CONVEYANCE FROM THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY FOR A SITE 
KNOWN AS THE LAFAYETTE SCHOOL SITE UNDER 
THE PRETEXT THAT THE SAME IS FOR THE 
ERECTION THEREON OF A FEDERAL BUILDING, 
THAT ONLY ONE FEDERAL BUILDING IS PLANNED 
AT THIS TIME, AND BY REASON OF SUCH FACT 
DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION IS 
ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING ANOTHER SITE FOR 
A FEDERAL BUILDING. 
POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
PORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION, IN THAT, AS ALLEGED IN THE COM-
PLAINT SAID DEFENDANT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
TO USE THE TRUST OR OTHER FUNDS HELD BY IT 
TO PAY PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF A SITE 
FOR A FEDERAL BUILDING. 
POINT TEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
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PORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IN THAT, AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, 
TO PERMIT SAID DEFENDANT AND ITS OWNER, 
DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT, TO 
USE THE TRUST FUND ENTRUSTED TO THEM FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF PAYING PART OF THE PURCHASE 
PRICE OF A FEDERAL BUILDING IT WILL RESULT IN 
THE TAKING OF PROPERTY OF THE BENEFICIARIES 
OF SUCH TRUST FUND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, AND OF SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE 
ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, AND LIKE-
WISE CONTRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SEC-
TION 22 OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH AND OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH 
PROVIDE THAT PRIVATE PROPERTY MAY NOT BE 
TAKEN FOR A PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COM-
PENSATION. 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
PORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IN THAT PLAINTIFF BY SUCH RULING IS 
DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO SHOW THAT BY THE 
TRANSACTION BY WHICH DEFENDANT ZIONS SEC-
URITIES, AND ITS OWNER, THE CORPORATION OF 
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THE PRESIDENT, SEEK TO INDUCE THE UNITED 
STATES TO SELECT A SITE FOR A FEDERAL BUILD-
ING PROPERTY WHICH IS NECESSARY AND IS BEING 
USED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS GOVERN-
MENTAL FUNCTIONS AS AN ARM OF THE STATE, 
AND IN AN ATTEMPT TO DOMINATE THE STATE 
AND TO INTERFERE WITH ITS FUNCTIONS, CON-
TRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF 
ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
AND ITS SECRETARY, GUS P. BACKMAN, TO DISMISS 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT SUCH DE-
FENDANTS BEING PARTIES TO THE PURPORTED 
CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF THE CITY PROPERTY 
AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS ARE INDIS-
PENSABLE PARTIES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
POINT THIRTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT CORPORATION 
OF THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IN THAT SUCH DEFENDANT IS AN IN-
DISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE ACTION INVOLVING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE PURPORTED CONTRACT 
WHEREBY DEFENDANT CITY SEEKS TO SELL AND 
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DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT 
SEEKS TO PURCHASE THE FOREST DALE PARK. 
POINT FOURTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND OF ITS OWNED DEFENDANT ZIONS 
SECURITIES CORPORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT, BY SUCH DIS-
MISSAL, PLAINTIFF IS PREVENTED FROM SHOWING 
THAT SUCH DEFENDANTS ARE DOMINATING THE 
FUNCTIONS OF AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, AND INTERFERING WITH ITS FUNCTION 
CONTRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 
OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT FIFTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DENY 
THE VARIOUS MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO SEVER 
THE TRIAL OF THE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION. 
POINT SIXTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED NOT ONLY IN THE 
MATTERS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED, BUT IN FAIL-
ING TO HAVE THIS CASE PROCEED TO A FINAL 
DETERMINATION IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY 
LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT TO THE 
END THAT SALT LAKE CITY MAY ACQUIRE A FED-
ERAL BUILDING IN A LAWFUL MANNER. 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
It will be seen that Appellants have raised numerous 
points on this appeal. We have done so for the purpose of 
an attempt to receive an adjudication of all the questions 
raised by the pleadings so that this Court may render such 
a Decree as will set at rest the various matters which divide 
not only the parties to this action, but the public generally. 
We are mindful that the law applicable to the defendants 
Corporation of the President and Zions Securities Corporation 
is probably the same, that is to say, all of the stock of defen-
dant Zions Securities being owned by the Corporation of the 
President, the former Corporation may lawfully perform only 
such functions as may lawfully be performed by the Corpora-
tion of the President. If the Court should conclude otherwise, 
we have by our points attacked the judgment of the Trial 
Court as if the Corporation of the President and Zions Sec-
urities are vested with separate and distinct authority. We 
shall discuss this phase of the case later in this Brief. 
The failure of the Trial Court to overrule the various 
Motions to Dismiss and permit the various defendants to 
answer, and having done so hold a pretrial may confine the 
appellants more closely to the allegations of the Complaint 
than would have been the case if there had been a pretrial, 
that is to say, a pretrial frequently has the effect of more fully 
and clearly bringing out the matters which divide the parties 
to a controversy. However, it is, of course, elementary law that 
in the dismissal of an action on Motions such as were made 
in the Court below every fact well pleaded must be taken 
as true. 
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POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE CITY AND 
ITS COMMISSIONERS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT SAID DEFENDANTS 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 
U.CA. 1953, 10-7-2, and 10-8-8, BEFORE MAKING ITS 
PURPORTED CONTRACT TO SELL THE PROPERTY 
AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS. 
U.CA. 1933, 10-7-2, provides: 
"When by this title power is conferred upon the 
Board of Commissioners, City Council or Board of 
Trustees to do and perform any act or thing and the 
manner of exercising the same is not specifically pointed 
out, the board of commissioners, city council or board 
of trustees may provide by ordinance the manner and 
details necessary for the full exercise of such powers." 
U.CA. 1953, 10-8-8, provides: 
"They (commissioners) may lay out, establish, open, 
alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise 
improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, 
parks, airports and public grounds and may vacate the 
same or parts thereof by ordinance." (Italics ours). 
At the oral argument defendant City and its Commissioners 
cited and seem to get some comfort out of the provision of 
U.CA. 1953, 10-8-2, which grants to cities authority to dispose 
of its property and which contains this provision "and may do 
all other things in relation thereto as natural persons.'' Ob-
viously such provision does not nullify the provisions of U.CA. 
1953, 10-7-2 and 10-8-8 above quoted. Moreover, a private 
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person who holds property in trust may not dispose of the 
property so held in trust, contrary to the provisions of the 
instrument creating the trust. As we understand the opinion in 
the case of Daisy Rowley v. Milford City, 352 P2nd 225, this 
Court held that a city must enact an ordinance as a prerequisite 
to the sale of its property as required by U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-8. 
In that case the property involved was a city park. Such fact, 
however, does not relieve the city from the necessity of passing 
an ordinance as a prerequisite to a valid sale of the property 
here involved. It will be noted that the act includes "public 
grounds." The property at First South and State Streets is 
public ground. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE CITY AND 
ITS COMMISSIONERS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT SAID DEFENDANTS 
DID NOT PASS ANY LAWFUL RESOLUTION OR 
DECLARATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO SELL THE 
PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS, 
DID NOT GIVE ANY LAWFUL NOTICE OF THE SALE 
OF SAID PROPERTY, DID NOT RECEIVE ANY LAW-
FUL BID FOR THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY, DID 
NOT MAKE A LAWFUL ACCEPTANCE OF A BID FOR 
THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY, AND DID NOT ENTER 
INTO A LAWFUL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE 
THEREOF. 
The authorities are to the effect that the only difference 
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between a resolution and an ordinance is that the former is 
temporary in nature, and an ordinance is of a permanent nature. 
See 62 C.J.S. 778, and cases there cited. See also: McQuillin 
Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, page 657. 
The requirements of a valid ordinance and by comparison 
a resolution are thus enumerated in the Second Edition of 
Vol. 2 at page 672, of McQuillin on Municipal Corporations. 
" 1 . It must be promulgated by a public or municipal 
corporation duly created and legally existing. 
2. It must emanate by virtue of power in a corporation. 
3. It must relate to a subject within the scope of the 
corporation. 
4. It must be in harmony with the Constitution of the 
United States and the state, the laws and treaties 
of the United States, the laws of the state, the muni-
cipal charter and equity in force in the state. 
5. Unless it originated by virtue of express delegated 
power by the state it must be reasonable in its terms. 
6. It must be adopted by the authorized tribunal legally 
convened. 
7. It must be in form as provided. 
8. It must be precise, definite and certain in expression. 
9- It must be passed in the manner prescribed. 
10. It must be enacted in good faith, in the public in-
terest alone, and designed to enable the corporation 
to perform its true functions as a local government 
organ." 
A reading of the Complaint, together with the Answer 
of defendants City and its Commissioners, will show that the 
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proceedings had in connection with the purported contract for 
the sale of city property at First South and State Streets is full 
of infirmities that are fatal to its validity. If permitted to do 
so plaintiff will show that on December 1, 1959, defendant 
Gus P. Backman as Secretary of the Salt Lake City Chamber 
of Commerce, wrote a long letter to Adiel F. Stewart, then the 
Mayor of defendant Salt Lake City, in which letter Mr. Back-
man outlined the difficulties that would be encountered in 
the construction of a Federal Building at the Lafayette School 
site, and that he had taken the matter of securing another site 
for a Federal Building up with the authorities of Zions Securi-
ties and the authorities of the Latter-day Saints Church; that 
he had also contacted Mr. Franklin G. Floete, Administrator 
of the General Services Administration of the United States, 
who indicated he would be willing to consider giving up any 
claim that the United States may have to purchase the Lafayette 
School site, provided the Government was made whole in all 
of the expenditures made to date for architectural, engineering 
and other expenses in connection with the North Temple 
location. In that letter Mr. Backman urged Mayor Stewart 
to take immediate steps to sell the city property at First South 
and State Streets. 
Plaintiff will also show, if and when permitted to do so, 
that on January 21, I960, a Resolution was passed to the effect 
that the buildings of the City were obsolete, and that new 
suitable structures should be acquired together with a new 
location upon which to construct the same. 
Plaintiff will also show, if and when permitted to do so, 
that on January 28, I960, a Motion was made and carried that 
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the attached Notice for the sale of the Public Safety Building 
be adopted, and that the City Recorder publish the same; that 
the City did publish a Notice that the property at First South 
and State Streets would be sold; that 2% of the price bid must 
accompany the bid, and that "No bid other than for immediate 
cash payment will be considered." The first publication of the 
Notice was had on January 30, I960, and the last publication 
on February 2, I960. 
The only bid received was that of defendant Salt Lake 
Chamber of Commerce by Gus P. Backman, which is set out in 
full in paragraph 13, beginning on page 3 of the Complaint. 
It will be noted that the bid does not comply with the 
Notice, in that it does not provide for the immediate payment 
of cash, and moreover, the so-called bid may be withdrawn 
if a court action is brought to test the validity of the sale, or 
if a referendum election is brought for such purpose. 
Plaintiff will also show, if and when permitted to do so, 
that defendant City in passing on the bid did not accept the 
same according to its terms. In the purported acceptance of the 
bid the City had a number of conditions, among which was 
that it was able to secure other property, and the amount to 
be paid by the bidder, if delivery should not be made on 
January 1, 1961, should be reduced "on a pro-rata basis . . . 
on a total deduction to $25,000.00 during the time which the 
premises are withheld between January 1, 1961, and March 
23, 1961." 
It will be noted from the Answer filed by defendant City 
and its Commissioners that no claim is made that any ordinance 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was passed authorizing the sale of the property at First South 
and State Streets. 
The Resolution attached to their Answer merely dis-
parages that property. It falls far short of meeting a number 
of the requirements laid down by McQuilUn on Municipal 
Corporations above quoted. Indeed, it does not even provide 
that the property shall be sold. 
While the proceedings had in connections with the pur-
ported arrangements to sell the City property at First South 
and State Streets are so filled with legal infirmities as to render 
the same without legal effect, they do cast such a cloud on the 
title of the City to such property as to render it extremely 
unlikely that anyone else will buy that property so long as the 
cloud exists . 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE CITY AND 
ITS COMMISSIONERS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT THE PURPORTED BID 
MADE FOR THE PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND 
STATE STREETS WAS MADE BY DEFENDANT 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BY ITS SECRETARY, WHICH 
BID SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT THE SAME WAS FOR 
SOME ONE OTHER THAN THE CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, AND IT WAS KNOWN, OR SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN KNOWN BY DEFENDANTS CITY AND ITS 
COMMISSIONERS THAT DEFENDANT CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO MAKE 
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A BID FOR THE PURCHASE OF SAID PROPERTY, AND 
WITHOUT FUNDS TO PAY FOR THE SAME. 
It will be seen from the verified allegations of paragraph 
8, page 2, of the Complaint that the Articles of Incorporation 
of defendant Chamber of Commerce provide that: 
"The principal purpose of the corporation shall be 
to promote the general welfare of the City and County 
of Salt Lake and the State of Utah, to engage and assist 
in social relief work therein and to carry on such other 
related activities as are ordinarily and normally en-
gaged in by Chambers of Commerce." 
There is nothing in such Articles which may be said to 
authorize defendant Chamber of Commerce, or its Secretary, 
to engage in the business of assisting defendant Corporation 
of the President or its owned Zions Securities Corporation to 
prevail upon Mr. Floete of the General Services Administra-
tion of the United States to select a site for a Federal Building 
that meets with the approval of said defendants. It is made 
apparent by the letter which is quoted in paragraph 13, page 3, 
of the Complaint that such was the undertaking of the Chamber 
of Commerce by Gus P. Backman, its Secretary. While the 
City is authorized by proper procedure to sell its property, the 
method here adopted is an unreasonable and unlawful means 
of accomplishing such purpose. It is apparent that the means 
adopted were for the purpose of enabling defendants Corpora-
tion of the President and/or its owrned Zions Securities to 
select a site for a federal building. 
Plaintiff having been deprived by the dismissal of the 
action of the rights granted by Rules 26 and 33 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, we are not fully advised as to whether or 
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not the circuitous proceeding had in connection with the con-
templated sale offends against that provision of the common 
law which holds that the general public has an interest in public 
buildings which are to serve the public, and that the act of 
locating a public building at a particular place, if done for the 
purpose of enhancing private property, or other improper 
motive, is against public policy, and the courts will not permit 
the same to be done. That matter is discussed and cases cited 
in footnotes to 13 C.J. 437, Sec. 337, 17 C.J.S. 583, Sec. 217. 
It does seem extremely strange hat one holding funds in trust 
for the use of the beneficiaries of the trust should attempt 
to use the same to assist in purchase of a site for a Federal 
Building. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY AND ITS 
COMMISSIONERS, IN THAT ALL BUT ONE OF THE 
COMMISSIONERS WERE AT THE TIME OF THE PUR-
PORTED CONTRACT OF SALE MEMBERS OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
AND AS SUCH DISQUALIFIED FROM ENGAGING IN 
A TRANSACTION FOR A SALE OF THE PROPERTY 
AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS TO DEFEN-
DANTS, CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND/OR 
ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION BY REASON OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38. 
It is provided in U.C.A. 1933, 10-6-38, that: 
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"No officer of any municipal corporation shall be 
directly or indirectly interested in any contract . . . 
Any violation of the provisions of this section shall 
be a misdemeanor and every such contract or agree-
ment shall be void." 
While the contract here involved purports to be made with 
the Chamber of Commerce, it will be seen by the bid that 
such a claim is a sham. If permitted to do so, plaintiff will show 
that the certified check that accompanied the bid came from 
defendant Zions Securities Corporation, and that in truth and 
in fact, the entire transaction was for defendants Corporation 
of the President and Zions Security Corporation. It is, of course, 
the uniform holding of the courts, which doubtless requires 
no citation of authorities, that one may not accomplish indirectly 
that which can not be accomplished directly. 
It is, so far as we are able to ascertain, the uniform 
holdings of courts of last resort, and likewise the uniform view 
of respectable text writers, that a contract made between a 
city and another in which the members of the City Council 
or Commissioners are interested is void. We direct the attention 
of the Court to a few of the numerous authorities so holding. 
It is said in 43 Am. Jur. Sec. 266, page 81: 
"A public officer owes an individed duty to the 
public which he serves and is not permitted to place 
himself in a position which will subject him to conflict-
ing duties or expose him to the temptation of acting 
in any manner other than in the best interests of the 
public. . . . One of the most familiar applications of 
this doctrine is the rule which prevents an officer 
having an adverse interest in any contract which he 
executes on behalf of the public." 
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In 43 Am. ]ur. Sec. 300, page 107, it is said: 
"The general rule is to the effect that the interest 
of a public officer or stockholder in a corporation enter-
ing into a contractual relation with the public is a 
prohibited interest in the transaction within the mean-
ing of statutory provisions in substance—prohibiting 
a public officer from being interested directly or in-
directly in any contract with the public and of the 
common law principal against such interest based upon 
public policy, of which such statutory provisions are 
the concrete expression.'' 
We quote at length the following from Vol. 2, Dillon on 
Municipal Corporations, Sec. 773, page 1143: 
"At common law and generally under statutory en-
actment it is now established beyond question that a 
contract made by an officer of a municipality with 
himself, or in which he is interested, is contrary to 
public policy and tainted with illegality, and this rule 
applies whether such officer acts alone on behalf of 
the municipality or as a member of a board or council. 
Neither the fact that a majority of the votes of a council 
or board in favor of the contract are cast by dis-
interested officers, nor the fact that the officer interested 
did not participate in the proceedings, necessarily re-
lieves the contract from its vice. The fact that the 
interest of the offending officer in the valid contract 
is indirect and is very small is immaterial. The statutory 
prohibition is frequently so wide in its terms as to 
prohibit any officer from contracting with the muni-
cipality whether he takes part in the making of the 
contract or not. It is impossible to lay down any general 
rule defining the nature of the interest of a municipal 
officer which comes within the operation of these 
principles. Any direct or indirect interest in the subject 
matter is sufficient to taint the contract with illegality, 
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if the interest be such as to offset the judgment and 
conduct of the officer either in the making of the 
contract or in its performance. In general, the disquali-
fying interest must be of a pecuniary or proprietary 
nature. Contracts with firms in which a member of 
the Council or other municipal officer is a partner 
falls within the principal and the interest of the officer 
therein will taint any such contract with illegality. A 
member of the city council or other municipal officer 
if interested in a contract so as to taint it with illegality 
when the contract is made with a corporation of which 
he is an officer and under some circumstances with 
a corporation of which he is a stockholder, a contract 
made by an officer with a municipality contrary to 
• an express statutory prohibition which declares the 
act to be a criminal offense is void ab initio, although 
the statute does not pronounce it void. It cannot be 
given validity by any subsequent ratification short of 
a new contract made under circumstances absolutely 
avoiding the statutory prohibition/' 
In 63 C.JS. Sec. 988, beginning on page 557, it is said: 
"Both at common law and under statutory provisions, 
municipal contracts in which officers or employees of 
the city have a pecuniary interest are void. The rule 
rests on public policy and pertinent statutes are merely 
declaratory of the common law and public policy." 
To the same effect is stated to be the law by McQuillin 
on Municipal Corporations, Second Ed., Vol. 3, page 1269, 
Sec. 1354, et seq. See same author on page 531, page 629, Vol. 
2, where it is said that contracts from which municipal officers 
derive personal benefits not general to all citizens are void. 
Numerous cases are cited in footnotes to the text above men-
tioned in support thereof. 
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We direct the attention of the Court especially to a few 
of the numerous cases which hold that a public officer is 
disqualified from participating in a contract in which he has 
a direct or indirect interest. 
The case of Grady v. City of Livingston, 141 Pac. (2d) 
346, (Mont.), contains a lengthy discussion of the law with 
respect to the members of a City Council being precluded from 
dealing with a corporation in which its members are interested. 
The statutory law there involved contained these pro-
visions: 
"Sec. 445. The Mayor or any member of the council, 
or any city or town officer, or any relative or employee 
thereof shall not be directly or indirectly interested 
in the profits of any contract entered into by the council 
while he is or was an officer." 
"Sec. 446. Every contract made in violation of any 
of the provisoins of the two preceding sections may be 
avoided at the instance of any party except the officer 
interested therein." 
Four taxpayers of the City of Livingston, Montana, brought 
an action to recover money which the City had paid for gasoline, 
lumber and other materials which had been consumed by the 
City. Some of the members of the City Council were employees 
of the corporation from which the materials were purchased. 
The members of the Court were all agreed that the contracts 
there involved were invalid. Three of the five members of the 
Court held that the money paid for materials purchased and 
consumed by the City could not be recovered. That it would 
be inequitable for the City to have the use of the materials 
and also the money. The other two Justices dissented, and 
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held that the money may be recovered notwithstanding the 
City had consumed the materials for which the money had 
been paid. Numerous cases are cited in support of both the 
prevailing and the dissenting opinions. 
In the case of Clark v. Utah Construction Co., 51 Idaho 
857, 8 Pac. (2d) 454, there was involved the construction of 
a statute of Idaho which provided that: 
"No member of the board (county commissioners) 
must be interested, directly or indirectly in any property 
purchased for the use of the county, nor in any purchase 
or sale of property belonging to the county." 
A deed of county property was given to the wife of one of 
the Commissioners. The Court held that the deed was absolutely 
void without regard to whether the money used to pay for the 
deed was the separtae money of the wife or community funds. 
In the case of Miller v. City of Martinez, et al., 28 Cal. 
App. (2d) 364, 83 Pac. (2d) 519, under a statute that public 
officers may not make or be interested in contracts made in 
their official capacity with themselves or become interested 
in contracts thus made, it is held that a member of a City 
Council is ineligible as such official to make or consent to 
making a contract with his private employee, and a contract 
so made is void as against public policy, and that the interest 
of the public officer need not be financial, but may be any 
interest which would tend to prevent him from exercising 
absolute loyalty and undivided allegiance to the best interest 
of the city. 
In the case of Bay, et al., v. Davidson, et al., I l l S.W. 
25, 133 Iowa 688, it is held that it matters not if he (council-
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
man) did in fact make his private interest subservient to his 
public duties. It is the relation that the law condemns, not 
the result. 
In the case of Foster v. Cope, 60 NJ.L. 78, 36 Atl. 1089, 
it is held that a member of a City Council is disqualified from 
voting on a resolution awarding a contract to a corporation 
in which he was the holder of a single share of stock as col-
lateral security for an unpaid note. 
We shall not unduly prolong this Brief by an analysis 
of any of the numerous additional cases where the question of 
the disqualification of members of public offices are precluded 
from acting in cases where there is a conflict of interest. 
There does not seem to be any substantial conflict in adjudicated 
cases. There are some differences in the statutes of the various 
states, but the authorities generally are to this effect: 
1. That any direct or indirect interest that may tend to 
influence a public officer from attending solely to the 
interests of the public which he is serving will dis-
qualify such officers from participating in any trans-
action where his interests may conflict with the public 
interest. 
2. That it is the relation of the public officer to those 
with whom dealings are had that is of controlling 
importance. 
3. The fact that the officer make his other interest 
subservient to the public interest which he is serving 
does not remove his disqualification. 
4. The matter of good or bad motives as well as the 
amount fo money involved in a transaction is im-
material. 
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5. That in the absence of a statute so providing the 
interest that disqualifies the officer need not be mone-
tary. 
While there are cases which hold that a majority of the 
members of a City Council who are not disqualified may 
make a valid contract, the weight of authority seems to be 
that if any member is disqualified, especially if he votes for 
a contract, the same is invalid. 
If the Court is not convinced from the texts and cases 
heretofore cited that they support propositions 1 to 5 just 
mentioned, we refer the Court to the following additional 
cases: 
Stockton Plumbing and Supply Co. v. Wheeler, 68 
Cal. App. 292, 229 Pac. 1020; 
Nunemacher v. Louisville, 98 Ky. 334, 32 S.W. 1091; 
Byrne & Speed Coal Co. v. Louisville, 189 Ky. 346. 
224 S.W. 885; 
Bradley, etc, Co. v. Jacques, (Ky.) 110 S.W. 836; 
Gillen Co. v. Milwaukee, 174 Wis. 362, 183 N.W. 679; 
Harrison v. Elizabeth, 70 N J . Law 591, 57 A. 132; 
Hobbs, Welland Co. v. Milan, 293 Pac. 145; 
Woods v. Potter, 8 Cal. App. 41, 95 Pac. 1125; 
Ricks v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 57 P. 777; 
Moody v. Shuffleton, 203 Cal. 100, 262 Pac. 1095; 
Osborn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367; 
Pacific Vinegar Works v. Smith, 145 Cal. 352, 78 Pac. 
550; 
Hardy v. Gainesville, 121 Ga. 327; 
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City of Fort Wayne v. The Lake Shore, etc. R.R. Co., 
132 Ind. 558; 
Milford Box v. Water Co., 124 Pa. 610; 
O'Neil v. Flannagan, 98 Mo. 426; 
Goodrich v. Waterville, 88 Maine 39; 
Stone v. Bevaris, 88 Minn. 127; 
Brown v. Street Lighting Dist. No. 1 of Woodbridge 
Tp., et al., 
Wresenthal v. Atlantic City, 73 NJ.L. 245, 63 A. 759. 
See also: 140 A.L.R. 344, et seq.; 
133 A.L.R. 1257; 
74 A.L.R. 792; 
73 A.L.R. 1092; 
where the question of public officers' interest in contracts are 
annotated. 
If we understand correctly, the contention of defendants 
City and Commissioners is that it is only monetary interest 
that is inhibited by U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-36, and that the members 
of the City Commission who are members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints have no monetary interest 
that may be said to be in conflict with their duty to serve only 
the interests of Salt Lake City. 
We have heretofore directed the attention of the Court 
to the fact that the transacion brought in question by plaintiff's 
First Cause of Action is an attempt on behalf of the Corpo-
ration of the President acting through its owned Zions Securi-
ties to purchase the city property at First South and State 
Streets. That the Corporation of the President is the sole owner 
of Zions Securities Corporation, and that all of the assets of 
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the Corporation of the President are held in trust "for the 
benefit of the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, a religious society for the benefit of religion, for 
works of charity and for public worship." Thus the funds 
which are to be used for the purpose of purchasing the city 
property at First South and State Streets belong to the members 
of the L.D.S. Church. It is so provided in the Articles of 
Incorporation of the Corporation of the President. 
The attention of the Court is directed to the following 
cases which discuss the purposes for which the trust fund 
now held by defendants Corporation of the President and/or 
Zions Securities may be used: 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 481, 140 U.S. 665, 35 
L. Ed. 592; 
Untied States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 150 U.S. 145, 37 L. Ed. 1033; 
United States v. The Sole Corporation, The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, et al., 5 Utah 361; 
United States v. Church, 6 Utah 43; 
United States v. Church, 8 Utah 310. 
The Court may well become impatient before concluding 
the reading of those cases, some of which are exceptionally 
long. We shall, therefore, point out just what plaintiff claims 
for the law there announced. 
It will be observed from a reading of the sylabii of the 
foregoing cases that an act of Congress declared a forfeiture 
of asubstantial part of the property belonging to the Church 
because the same was being used for an unlawful purpose, 
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namely for the teaching and practice of polygamy. The Act 
of Congress in so providing was sustained by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, whereupon the question was pre-
sented as to what should be done with the forfeited property. 
It was determined that a receiver should be appointed to take 
charge of the forfeited property, and such receiver should make 
a recommendation to the Court with respect to the disposition 
that should be made of such property. It is made to appear 
that the property so declared forfeited had been paid by the 
members of the Church to be used for the same purposes as 
that specified in the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation 
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints above quoted, namely, for the benefit of the members 
of the Church and for works of charity, religion and public 
worship. It was suggested that the forfeited property be used 
for the support of the common schools. The Court rejected 
such suggestion for the reason that not all of those who attend 
the common school are members of the L.D.S. Church, and 
the trust fund could not be used for a purpose not intended 
by the donors. Before the matter was finally settled the Church 
had renounced the practice of polygamy, and that while the 
Church still maintained that the practice of polygamy was a 
correct doctrine, its practice having been discontinued, the 
forfeited property could be returned to the Church because 
it would no longer be used for the unlawful purpose. It is 
rarely that one finds pronouncement of both state and federal 
courts of last resort directly in point where the law applicable 
to state of facts such as are here present where it is adjudicated 
that trust funds may not be used for a purpose other than 
that for which the fund was given by the donor, except in case 
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the intended use of the fund is for an unlawful purpose. If, 
as the foregoing federal and state cases hold, that the money 
given to the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints must be used for the purposes for which 
the money was given by its members, so long as such proposed 
use is lawful it mulst follow that money given by the members 
of that Church to the Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints must be used 
for the purpose stated in the Articles of Incorporation of the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 
For this Court to hold otherwise would be to reverse both the 
Supreme Court of the United States and this Court. 
In our research we have been unable to find a case which 
indicates that a trust fund such as is here involved may law-
fully be used to purchase a site for a Federal Building, and 
we doubt that any such case can be found. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY AND ITS 
COMMISSIONERS WITHOUT GIVING THE PLAINTIFF 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS 
ALLEGED IN HIS COMPLAINT TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE CITY PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE 
STREETS IS BEING USED FOR OFFICES FOR THE 
EMPLOYES AND OFFICERS OF DEENDANT CITY IN 
THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TIONS; THAT THE BUILDINGS THERE LOCATED ARE 
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AMPLE TO SERVE SUCH PURPOSE FOR MANY MORE 
YEARS; THAT NO PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE FOR 
ACQUIRING FACILITIES TO TAKE CARE OF THE 
NEEDS THAT ARE NOW BEING PROVIDED FOR BY 
THE CITY PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE 
STREETS, AND DEFENDANT CITY IS PRESENTLY 
WITHOUT THE NECESSARY FUNDS TO SECURE 
OTHER BUILDING OR BUILDINGS TO SUPPLY THE 
NEEDS OF DEFENDANT CITY WHICH ARE NOW 
PROVIDED FOR BY THE CITY PROPERTY AT FIRST 
SOUTH AND STATE STREETS. 
But little need be said in support of this point. Plaintiff 
is entitled to be heard on the allegations of his Complaint, 
and if the facts therein alleged are found to be true, he is 
entitled to prevail. 
While the City and its Commissioners filed an Answer 
in effect denying the allegations mentioned in this Point Five, 
the Answer of defendants City and its Commissioners may not 
be said to support the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. No 
Finding was or could properly be made as to the truth of 
the allegations of the Answer without evidence to support 
the same. The allegations of the Complaint above referred 
to and the allegations of the Answer made an issue that required 
a trial to ascertain wherein lies the truth. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT THE MOTION OF LYNN FAUSETT AND 
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FIAMETTA FAUSETT TO INTERVENE IN THIS 
ACTION. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide: 
"Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted 
to intervene in an action (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene or (2) when the rep-
resentation of the applicants' interests by existing 
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is 
or may be bound by a judgment in the action, or (3) 
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely 
affected by a distribution or other disposition of prop-
erty which is in the custody or subject to the control 
or disposition of the court or an officer thereof." 
Subdivision (b) of Rule 24 provides for Permissive Inter-
vention. 
The Fausetts contend that they come within Subdivision 
(a) of Rule 24 and, therefore, have a right to intervene. 
In their proposed Complaint of Intervention, paragraph 
2 thereof, the Fausetts allege: 
"That these plaintiffs in intervention are and at all 
times herein alleged have been residents of Salt Lake 
City and County, State of Utah; that they are now and 
at all times herein alleged have been property owners 
and taxpayers in said City, County and State, and that 
they are and at all times herein alleged they have been 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (the religious organization mentioned in the 
Complaint filed herein) and have made contributions 
in tithing and otherwise to said Church; that by reason 
of said contributions so made and being members of 
such Church they have a vested interest in the Trust 
Fund mentioned in the Complaint filed herein.'' 
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In paragraph 2 they allege that they bring their action for 
all other persons similarly situated because the members are 
so numerous that it is impossible to make all of such members 
parties to the action. They also adopt the allegations of the 
Complaint. It will be observed that in the Complaint plaintiff 
does not claim that he is presently a member of the L.D.S. 
Church. That being so it may be doubted if he may be heard 
to complain of the manner in which the trust fund held by 
defendants Corporation of the President and Zions Securities 
are being expended notwithstanding plaintiff while a member 
of such Church paid his tithing and made other contributions 
to the L.D.S. Church. 
In light of these facts the interest of the Fausetts in the 
trust fund here involved may well be inadequately represented 
by plaintiff, and their interest in the trust fund may be adversely 
affected if the Court should hold that some of such fund may 
be used to purchase a Federal Building. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT 
AND/OR DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORA-
TION WITHOUT GIVING PLAINTIFF AN OPPOR-
TUNITY TO SHOW AS ALLEGED N HIS COMPLAINT 
THAT SUCH CORPORATION INTENDS TO AND WILL, 
UNLESS RESTRAINED BY THE COURT, UNLAWFULLY 
AND WITHOUT AUTHORITY USE SOME OF THE 
TRUST FUNDS HELD BY IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
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PAYING OR CAUSE TO BE PAID SOME OF THE COSTS 
OF PURCHASING A SITE FOR A FEDERAL BUILDING. 
Without repeating what is said under the foregoing Point 
Four, we adopt the same in support of this Point Seven. It 
was argued in the court below and the trial court apparently 
took the view that the funds held by the Corporation of the 
President and/or Zions Securities are not trust funds; that 
the members of the City Commission who are and were at the 
time and times complained of also members of the L.D.S. 
Church and had no interest in the fund held by the Corporation 
of the President and Zions Securities; that any interest that 
the City Commisisoners may have in the funds so held by such 
Corporations were not a monetary interest, and, therefore, such 
Commissioners were not disqualified from participating in a 
sale of the City property to Zions Securities or its nominee. 
It may be inquired if the members of the City Commission 
who are and were members of the L.D.S. Church at the time 
complained of were not the owners of an interest in the 
trust fund held by the defendants Corporation of the President 
and Zions Securities, who owns that property? The members 
of the L.D.S. Church are expressly made the beneficiaries 
of the property of the Corporation of the President by its 
Articles of Incorporation. The Corporation of the President 
owns Zions Securities Corporation. There is thus no escape 
from the conclusion that the City Commissioners are among 
the persons who own the assets of defendants, Corporation 
of the President and Zions Securities. If such ownership is not 
a monetary interest, then what sort of an interest is it ? Plaintiff 
is prepared to show that the Corporation of the President 
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and Zions Securities are the owners of several hundred million 
dollars worth of real and personal property, among which 
are colleges, churches, temples, real estate, various kinds of 
commercial enterprises, together with stocks and investments 
in numerous undertakings. It may well be that the members 
of the L.D.S. Church have no right to take possession of such 
assets, but they do have a right to have the same applied to 
the purposes for which it was created, and which are specified 
in the Articles of Incorporation of defendant Corporation of 
the President. 
The facts in this case will show that the members of the 
L.D.S. Church who were and are members of the Commission 
of Salt Lake City have a very substantial financial or proprietary 
interest in the property here involved. The members of the 
L.D.S Church have a pecuniary interest in the trust fund held 
by the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. It is so provided in its Articles 
of Incorporation. The fund was given to the Church, or to its 
corporation, for the purpose set out in the Articles of its 
Corporation of the President of the Church, namely, for the 
members of the Church. It would seem obvious that to have 
a Church, a Tabernacle and a Temple available to attend by 
a beneficiary and his family without charge is a financial 
advantage or interest of the highest order. To have schools 
in which one's religious beliefs are taught are not without 
monetary value. To have hospitals maintained for one's use 
and for an assurance that in case of finanical misfortune one's 
needs in case of sickness will be cared for, are matters which 
have a financial value not to be lightly cast aside. In the case 
of a beneficiary of a trust fund the beneficiary thereof has a 
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right to have the fund applied to the uses provided for in the 
instrument creating the fund. The same is true of the stock-
holders in a corporation. In the one case the trustee and 
in the other the Board of Directors control the fund intrusted 
to them. In each case the fund must be used for the purposes 
and in the manner provided for by the instrument creating 
the fund. In each case the benefits to be derived from the money 
or other property involved in the venture must be used for 
the benefit of the persons who own the fund, in the one case 
for the beneficiaries, and in the other the stockholders. If a 
trust fund is not being used for the purposes provided in the 
instrument creating the fund, the remedy is by bringing an 
action against the trustee to force compliance with the pro-
visions of the instrument creating the fund. If the trust is a 
private trust, the proceeding should be brought by one or more 
of the beneficiaries of the trust. Boquist on Trust and Trustees, 
Vol. 1, page 274, where the following cases are cited which 
support the text: 
Barker v. Crane, 100 A. 900; 87 N.J. Eq. 227; 
Hamilton v. Muncie, 169 N.Y.S. 826; 
McElvie v. Adams, 97 S.E. 733, 108 S.C. 437; 
But suppose by some metaphysical reasoning it should be 
concluded that the interest of the members of the City Com-
mission who were also members of the L.D.S. Church is not 
a monetary interest, how stands the case? 
It is the very essence of the L.D.S. religion that the 
President of that Church, who also constitutes the Corporation 
of the President, is a prophet, seer and revelator, and as such 
such is the emissary of diety on this earth. The Court will take 
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judicial notice of that being so. Hilton v. Roy lance, 25 U. 129, 
69 Pac. 660. If it be kept in mind that the disqualification 
of a public officer is determined by his relation to the party 
with whom a transaction is to be had, there would seem to be 
no room for doubt that a member of the L.D.S. Church who 
is urged by the prophet, seer and revelator of his Church and 
the emissary of diety on this earth would be prone to comply 
with a request coming from that source. It would be an act 
bordering on heresy not to do so. If there is any doubt about 
that being so, plaintiff is entitled to and will, if permitted, 
establish that fact in conformity with the allegation contained 
in (b) of paragraph 21 of his Complaint. The authorities 
heretofore cited teach not only must a City Commissioner be 
loyal solely to the interests of the city, but he may not put 
himself in a position that may tend to cause him to do other-
wise. 
It may further be observed that the provisions of U.C.A. 
1953, 10-6-38, does not designate the kind of interest that 
disqualifies a commissioner from participating in a trans-
action when he has an adverse interest. To say that it must be 
a monetary interest is to ignore the plain language of the act. 
It will be observed that in the cases indicating that the interest 
must be monetary it is so provided in the statute being con-
strued. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION, IN 
49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THAT SUCH CORPORATION ALREADY HAS RE-
CEIVED A CONVEYANCE FROM THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY FOR A SITE 
KNOWN AS THE LAFAYETTE SCHOOL SITE UNDER 
THE PRETEXT THAT THE SAME IS FOR THE 
ERECTION THEREON OF A FEDERAL BUILDING, 
THAT ONLY ONE FEDERAL BUILDING IS PLANNED 
AT THIS TIME, AND BY REASON OF SUCH FACT 
DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION IS 
ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING ANOTHER SITE FOR 
A FEDERAL BUILDING. 
It will be noted from the pleadings that the Board of 
Education of Salt Lake City has heretofore conveyed to de-
fendant Zions Securities Corporation a site which is claimed 
to be for a Federal Building. While that case has not yet 
been finally disposed of, Zions Securities Corporation has a 
conveyance of the Lafayette School site which was acquired 
for the purpose of having erected thereon a Federal Building. 
That being so, defendants may not be heard to seek another 
site for a Federal Building without releasing all claims to 
the Lafayette School site. One of the bases for the application 
of the doctrine of estoppel is thus stated in 19 Am. Jur., page 
650, Sec. 50: 
"Generally speaking a party will not be permitted 
to ccupy inconsistent positions or to take a position 
in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or 
inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at 
least when he had or was chargeable with full knowl-
edge of the facts and another will be prejudiced by his 
action." 
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Numerous cases from obth state and federal courts are cited 
in footnotes to the text, some of which we have examined 
and they support the law announced in the text. 
Defendants may not use a pretext for acquiring public 
property that the same is being acquired for a site for a public 
building and after having by that means acquired one piece 
of public property proceed to acquire another piece of property 
while continuing to hold the first piece so acquired. 
POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
PORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION, IN THAT, AS ALLEGED IN THE COM-
PLAINT SAID DEFENDANT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
TO USE THE TRUST OR OTHER FUNDS HELD BY IT 
TO PAY PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF A SITE 
FOR A FEDERAL BUILDING. 
It is, of course, uniformly established that a private cor-
pporation has such powers and only such powers as are granted 
to it by its Articles of Incorporation. 
The law is thus expressed in 19 C.J.S. Sec. 935, page 369: 
"A corporation has no natural rights or capacity 
such as an individual or an ordinary partnership and 
has no powers except such as are expressly or impliedly 
conferred by its charter. This principle was well estab-
lished in the civil law and in adopting corporate 
insttiutions from that law the same principle was 
adopted as a part of the English common law and 
it applies to every kind of corporation/' 
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There will be found collected in footnotes to the text numerous 
state and federal cases which support the text. Among the 
cases which in effect so held are: Hadlock v. Callister, 85 Utah 
510, 39 Pac. (2d) 1082; Getzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross 
Hospital Assn., 32 Utah 46; Gorey v. St. Joe Mine Co., 32 
Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369. It was argued in the court below 
that it did not appear that plaintiff is a stockholder in defendant 
Zions Securities. Such fact does not prevent him from being 
heard that the City is attempting to convey property to one 
for a purpose not authorized by law. Moreover, as heretofore 
argued, the Fausetts being owners of an interest in the trust 
fund held by the Corporation of the President and/or Zions 
Securities had an interest in the manner in which the assets 
of such corporation are being used. It will be seen that plaintiff 
in his Complaint alleged that Zions Securities was without 
authority to use the assets held by it for the purpose of pur-
chasing a site for a federal building. That being so, plaintiff 
and the Fausetts are entitled to be heard on that issue. 
Moreover, tested by the well-established law that a corpo-
ration has only such powers as are granted to it by the law 
making power and as provided in its articles of incorporation, 
the defendant Corporation of the President may not lawfully 
own and operate such corporations as defendant Zions Securi-
ties. Under the provisions of our statutory law, Title 16, 
Chapter 7 of U.C.A. 1953, it is provided: 
§1 "Corporations sole may be formed for acquiring 
holding or disposing of church or religious society 
property for the benefit of religion, for works of 
charity, and for public worship in the manner herein-
after provided." 
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§ 2 provides for the persons who may become a 
corporation sole and the manner of creating such a 
corporation. 
§ 6 provides for the powers that may be exercised 
by a corporation sole. Subsection ( l ) thereof provides 
that it shall have power "to acquire and possess by 
donation, gift, bequest, devise or purchase, and to hold 
and maintain property, real, personal and mixed, and 
to grant, sell, convey, rent or otherwise dispose of the 
same as may be necessary to carry on or promote the 
objects of the corporation." 
The other provisions granting powers to corporations 
sole have no application to the matter now being discussed. For 
authorities holding that religious corporations may not law-
fully engage in enterprises for profit, see 100 A.L.R. 579 and 
76 CJ.S. 780 and cases there cited. 
If the Corporation of the President may not directly 
spend its funds for the purchase of a site for a federal building, 
it necessarily follows that it may not create a corporation with 
the power to do that which the parent corporation is powerless 
to do. It will further be noted that plaintiff in his complaint 
alleges that defendant Zions Securities is without power to use 
its funds to aid in the purchase of a site for a federal building. 
The trial court was in error in denying plaintiff the right to 
show that Zions Securities is without authority to use its funds 
to assist in the purchase of a site for a federal building. When 
the facts in this case are revealed, it will be made to appear 
that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the Cor-
poration of the President of such church, and Zions Securities 
Corporation, together with other corporations owned solely 
by the Corporation of the President, are all in essence one and 
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the same organizations. That being so, it follows that the 
powers of the parent corporation may not lawfully enlarge 
its powers by creating additional corporations which are owned 
and operated by the parent corporation. 
If the Corporation of the President may organize or cause 
to be organized corporations which are owned and controlled 
by the Corporation of the President and which are vested 
with the powers usually exercised by corporations organized 
for profit, the Corporation of the President may by that means 
acquire unlimited power contrary to and in violation of the 
provisions of Title 16, Chapter 7 of U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT TEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
PORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IN THAT, AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, 
TO PERMIT SAID DEFENDANT AND ITS OWNER, 
DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT, TO 
USE THE TRUST FUND ENTRUSTED TO THEM FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF PAYING PART OF THE PURCHASE 
PRICE OF A FEDERAL BUILDING IT WILL RESULT IN 
THE TAKING OF PROPERTY OF THE BENEFICIARIES 
OF SUCH TRUST FUND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, AND OF SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE 
ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, AND LIKE-
WISE CONTRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SEC-
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TION 22 OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH AND OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH 
PROVIDE THAT PRIVATE PROPERTY MAY NOT BE 
TAKEN FOR A PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COM-
PENSATION. 
It may be that if plaintiff has forfeited his right to his 
interest in the trust fund, he may not be heard to complain 
if defendants use such fund for a purpose not authorized by 
law, but that does not apply to the Fausetts. As we have here-
tofore pointed out, they have a vested interest in such fund, 
and if the Court should so construe the law of Utah as to 
permit the use of that fund to pay for a part of a Federal 
Building site, such use would be at war with the very essence 
of due process of law, and would constitute a taking of property 
for a public purpose without compensating the owners of 
said trust fund, contrary to the provisions of the State and 
Federal Constitutions above mentioned. Certain it is that if 
the Fausetts may thus be deprived of their interest in the trust 
fund, there is a total absence of due process of law, and likewise 
if their interest in the trust fund may be lawfully used to pay 
for part of a Federal Building site without them being paid 
for the same, it will constitute the taking of their property 
without compensation. To hold otherwise will be to ignore * 
their constitutional rights. 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
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PORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IN THAT PLAINTIFF BY SUCH RULING IS 
DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO SHOW THAT BY THE 
TRANSACTION BY WHICH DEFENDANT ZIONS SEC-
URITIES, AND ITS OWNER, THE CORPORATION OF 
THE PRESIDENT, SEEK TO INDUCE THE UNITED 
STATES TO SELECT A SITE FOR A FEDERAL BUILD-
ING PROPERTY WHICH IS NECESSARY AND IS BEING 
USED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS GOVERN-
MENTAL FUNCTIONS AS AN ARM OF THE STATE, 
AND IN AN ATTEMPT TO DOMINATE THE STATE 
AND TO INTERFERE WITH ITS FUNCTIONS, CON-
TRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF 
ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
It is a matter of the history of Utah of which the Court 
wil take judicial notice, that prior to the admission of Utah 
as a state of the United States the people of Utah were divided 
into two political parties, one known as the Peoples Party, to 
which belonged the members of the L.D.S. Church, and the 
other known as the Liberal Party, to which belonged the 
residents of Utah who were not members of the L.D.S. Church. 
This condition led to many unpleasantries and to the injury 
of the welfare of the then Territory of Utah. 
When the Constitution of Utah was being written it was 
sought to do away with this condition, and to have the State 
divide on national party lines. To accomplish that end Section 
4 of Article One was placed in the Constitution. It will be 
seen from the allegations of the Complaint that defendants 
Corporation of the President and Zions Securities have within 
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the period of one year attempted, and if permitted to prevail 
in this action, will have acquired three very important tracts 
of land which have heretofore and are now being used for 
carrying on some of the most important functions of the arms 
of the State. In each case that purpose is sought to be accom-
plished by public officials who are members of the L.D.S. 
Church, and if permitted to do so, plaintiff will show that some 
of such members of such Church are the holders of important 
positions in that Church. That being so, the plan to secure 
the title to the public property here involved is calculated to 
enable such defendants to dominate the affairs of the State, 
and to interfere with its functions, contrary to the provisions 
of Section 4 of Article One of the Constitution of Utah. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
AND ITS SECRETARY, GUS P. BACKMAN, TO DISMISS 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT SUCH DE-
FENDANTS BEING PARTIES TO THE PURPORTED 
CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF THE CITY PROPERTY 
AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE STREETS ARE INDIS-
PENSABLE PARTIES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
It is uniformly held to be the law that all parties to a 
contract are indispensable unless the contract is severable. As 
heretofore pointed out, the Court erred in dismissing plaintiff's 
First Cause of Action as to defendant City and its Commis-
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sioners. If that be so, it was likewise error to dismiss the action 
as to defendants Chamber of Commerce and Gus P. Backman. 
One of the leading cases dealing with the question of 
when a party should be made a defendant, and when a party 
must be made a defendant is that of Shields v. Barron, 17 How. 
130, 139, 15 L. Ed. 158, 161. That case has repeatedly been 
cited and followed by state and federal courts. 
From our research that case has never been overruled or 
the doctrine there announced questioned. It is there said: 
"Persons having an interest in the controversy and 
who ought to be made parties in order that the court 
. . . may finally determine the entire controversy and 
to complete justice by adjusting all the rights in it 
. . . are commonly termed necessary parties, but if 
their interests are separable from those of the parties 
before the court so that the court can proceed to a 
decree, and do complete final justice without affecting 
other persons, not before the court, the latter are not 
indispensable parties. Persons who not only have an 
interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a 
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either 
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in 
such a condition that its final termination may be wholly 
inconsistent with equity and in good conscience are 
indispensable parties." 
In this case the agreement here brought in question was 
between defendants Chamber of Commerce by its Secretary, 
Gus P. Backman, and the City. The Chamber of Commerce 
cannot be eliminated from the contract, as there would be no 
one before the court with whom the City has a contract. More-
over, it is alleged in the Complaint that neither defendant 
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Gus P. Backman nor the Chamber of Commerce had authority 
to make the contract here brought in question. If that be so, 
the purported contract is a nullity. In order that the legal effect 
of the purported contract may be determined, it is necessary 
to have before the court Gus P. Backman. That is the effect of 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT THIRTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT CORPORATION 
OF THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IN THAT SUCH DEFENDANT IS AN IN-
DISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE ACTION INVOLVING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE PURPORTED CONTRACT 
WHEREBY DEFENDANT CITY SEEKS TO SELL AND 
DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT 
SEEKS TO PURCHASE THE FOREST DALE PARK. 
Much of what has been said in support of Point Twelve 
is applicable to this point, and we adopt the same in support 
of this point. The error in granting the Motion of the Corpo-
ration of the President dismissing the action as to it, and 
denying the Motion of the City and its Commissioners to 
dismiss the action as to them leaves this Second Cause of 
Action hopelessly suspended. That the Corporation of the 
President is an indispensable party to the Second Cause of 
Action is obvious. It is one of the parties to the purported 
contract for the sale of the Forest Dale Park. Any judgment 
rendered in the cause must of necessity affect the rights, if any, 
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of defendant Corporation of the President. That being so, the 
trial court is powerless to proceed without the Corporation of 
the President being a party to the action. Thus a stalemate is 
created by the ruling of the trial court dismissing the action 
as to the Corporation of the President, and denying the Motion 
of defendants City and its Commissioners to dismiss the action 
as to them. While the defendants City and its Commissioners 
remain in the action the court is powerless to proceed further 
against them because a court may not proceed to hear and 
determine a case in the absence of an indispensable party 
such as defendant Corporation of the President. 
POINT FOURTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND OF ITS OWNED DEFENDANT ZIONS 
SECURITIES CORPORATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, IN THAT, BY SUCH DIS-
MISSAL, PLAINTIFF IS PREVENTED FROM SHOWING 
THAT SUCH DEFENDANTS ARE DOMINATING THE 
FUNCTIONS OF AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, AND INTERFERING WITH ITS FUNCTION 
CONTRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 
OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
In support of this Point we adopt what is said under 
Point Eleven of this Brief. 
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POINT FIFTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DENY 
THE VARIOUS MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO SEVER 
THE TRIAL OF THE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Rule 20 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"All persons may be joined in one action as defend-
ants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, 
or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of, 
as arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or 
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question 
of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the 
action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested 
in obtaining or defending against all the relief de-
manded, judgment may be given for one or more of the 
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief 
and against one or more defendants according to their 
respective liabilities.'' 
In each of the causes of action alleged in the Complaint 
the City is attempting to convey City property to the Corpo-
ration of the President, or what amounts to the same thing, 
to Zions Securities, which is owned by the Corporation of the 
President. In each cause the members, or a majority of the 
members, of the City Commission who participated in the 
attempted sale were members of the L.D.S. Church, and as 
such disqualified from participating in the attempetd sale. That 
being so, there is a question of law common to each cause 
of action, namely, whether the transaction is valid because 
of the members of the City Commission who are members of 
the L.D.S. Church may lawfully participate in a contract for 
the sale of City property, and whether as a matter of law 
it is necessary to enact an ordinance authorizing the sale of 
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City property before the same may lawfully be sold. The 
determination of these two questions may well be of controlling 
importance. The trial and determination of the First Cause 
of Action will in effect dispose of the Second Cause of Action. 
That being so, nothing will be accomplished by severing the 
two causes of action, and the time of the Court and Counsel will 
be needlessly wasted. 
POINT SIXTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED NOT ONLY IN THE 
MATTERS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED, BUT IN FAIL-
ING TO HAVE THIS CASE PROCEED TO A FINAL 
DETERMINATION IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY 
LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT TO THE 
END THAT SALT LAKE CITY MAY ACQUIRE A FED-
ERAL BUILDING IN A LAWFUL MANNER. 
The law is, of course, well settled that an action may not 
lawfully be dismissed upon motions such as were here filed 
unless the Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
which relief may be granted. The numerous errors committed 
by the trial court which plaintiff has presented and argued in 
this Brief show that plaintiff's Causes of Action are not so 
wanting in either facts or law as to be vulnerable to attack 
by Motions to Dismiss. 
Plaintiff and the proposed Intervenors, therefore, submit 
that the judgment of the trial court be reversed; that this Court 
pass upon the various Points urged herein to the end that a new 
trial be had, and the Court below be advised as to the law 
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applicable to the facts alleged in the Complaint, and in the 
proposed Complaint in Intervention. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
721-26 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
BURTON. W. MUSSER, 
1133 Harvard Avenue, 
Salt Lake City 5, Utah. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
\ 
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